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STABILITY IN EAST ASIA:

THE U. S. ROLE

I am delighted that so many of you have joined us
today. I particularly want to thank the two main business
organizations represented here, and especially their leadership, for their efforts in advancing public understanding
of a major foreign pol1cy issue.
Both Councils have played
-- and will continue to play -- important roles in strengthening our econoreic relations.
It is now one month since the President announced that
the United States and the People's Republic of China had
reached agreement on the establishment of full and normal
diplomatic relations.
Today I would like to share with you
some of the background leading up to the President's historic decision, and outline what we believe it means for the
United States and for the world.
Few other foreign policy issues have so long divided
Americans as The China Question.
In the 1930's, Americans
became deeply aware and often passionately concerned with
the tragedy and suffering of China. In the early 1940's, our
two nations fought togethe::- against the Axis powers.
In the late 1940's we tried, ultimately without success, to
help the two sides in the Chir.ese civil war find a peaceful
settlement to their conflict.
Relations between the People's Republic of China and
the United States reached a nadir in the 1950's. Our armies
clashed in Korea, and at home the Chir.a issue left a
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deep mark on the domestic political landscape.
One of the
tragedies of that period was the destruction of the careers
of some outstanding Foreign Service officers because they
reported events in Asia as they saw them.
The impasse in our relations' with Peking persisted
despite the emergence during the 1960's of incontestable
evidence of serious rivalry between the Soviet Union and
China.
The United States, enmes h ed in military involvement in Southeast Asia, and China, preoccupied with the
Cultural Revolution, were unable to make progress towards
overcoming our differences.
1971 marked the beginning of a new phase.
Across a
vast gulf of misunderstanding and mutual distrust, the
governments
of Peking and the United States began a
dialogue, starting with Henry Kissinger's dramatic trip to
Peking in 1971 and President Nixon's visit in 1972.
The
Shanghai Communique of that year set a framework for our
new relationship.
But that dialogue was incomplete.
The United States
formally recognized the Republic of China -- whose de
facto control encompassed on l y Taiwan and a few adjacent
islands -- as the legal government of China.
Despite this,
we were able to begin contacts and ultimately, in 1973, even
establish Liaison Offices in Washington and Peking. But the
nature of the relationship with Peking remained limited
in scope and depth by the political, legal, and economic
implications of our lack of mutual recognition.
sti~l

Non-recognition
the delicate state in which we
dealt with Peking in the six years after the Shanghai
Communique -- presented daily p ractical probl e ms.
Although
both sides made major efforts to minimize these limitations,
they became increasingly inhibiting.
Discussions with
the Chinese often foundered on the fact that in the absence
of recognition, many activities either could not proceed at
all or had to be conducted at a low level.
Contacts were
constrained, including those that might have produced
greater understanding on global issues.
Trade was limited,
and opportunities often would go elsewhere.
Legal problems
hung over commercial transactions because of American
claims and frozen PRC assets dating back to 1950.
More
importantly, not to try to mo ve forward would have been to
risk moving backward -- a ~d b ac k ward movement in u.s.Chinese relations would have cai.lsed se r i ous damage to our
global position.
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So even before he was :naugurated , President Carter
made his first China decision.
In an act of continuity
with two previous Presidents, he reaff i rrned the Shanghai
Communique as the basis for our relationship, and specifically reaffirmed its commitment to work towards normal
relations.
We were not at all certain!at that time that we
could indeed reach that ultimate goal.
But we felt it
essential to try, and we were prepared to take as much time
as was necessary to achieve it on ah acceptable basis.
With this in mind, we began discussions within the
Administration, as well as an intensive series of consultations both with Members of Congress and with a wide crosssection of American businessmen, scholars, and others.
From
our consultations and review, two central thrusts, and
several specific concerns, emerged.
These basic thrusts could not have been clearer: on
the one hand, a substantial majority of Americans wished to
see the United States and the People's Republic of China
establish diplomatic relations; but at the same time, an
equally large majority had deep concerns about Taiwan's
future prosperity, security, and stability. We shared these
concerns. The President decided that we would only establish
diplomatic relations with Peking if such an action could be
accomplished in a way that did not damage the well-being of
the people on Taiwan or reduce the chances for a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.
Beyond these basic considerations, several specific
concerns emerged.
First, there was widespread and legitimate concern over Peking's insistence that prior to normalization the United States must unilaterally abrogate the
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, rather than terminate
it in accordance with its own provisions, to which the
United States and Taiwan had agreed in 1954. Furthermore, we
wished to establish that after normalization, even in the
absence of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, all other
agreements and treaties would remain in effect.
Second, we shared with Congress and
the American
public a deep concern over the strong assertions by Chinese
officials concerning their right to "liberate" Taiwan in any
way they saw fit.
From an American point of view, the
peaceful settlement of the ~aiwan issue by the Chinese
themselves was of critical i mportance; we could not move
forward if Peking continued to talk and think about the
Taiwan issue in such inf~ammatory terms.
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Third, a consensus rapidly emerged, ins ide and outside the government, that it was essential that we continue
a wide range of relations with the people on Taiwan on a
nongovernmental bas is after normalization.
In particular,
these post-normalization relations would have to include
continued sale of defensive weapons . to Taiwan.
With these priorities emerging, I visited Peking
in August of 1977, and Dr. Brzezinski went there in May of
1978.
We found a newly confident leadership emerging
in Peking as a period of intense internal turmoil subsided.
We found many points of common interest on global matters,
although on some important issues we continued to have
differences.
Our discussions on normalization were of an
exploratory nature.
These overall discuss ions reinforced
our view that a strong, secure and peaceful China was in the
interest of world peace.
In the early summer, President Carter instructed
Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the Liaison Office in
Peking, to beg in a series of presentations outlining our
views on normalization.
In five meetin g s, Ambassador
Woodcock laid out the American position.
On September 19, President Carter me t with the new
head of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, Ambassador
Chai Zemin.
Involving himself directly in the discussions
for the first time, the President told the Chinese that we
were ready to normalize relations if our concerns about the
future well-being of the people on Taiwan were met.
In completing his presentations on November 4, Ambassador Woodcock indicated t o the Chines e that we would be
willing to work toward a January 1, 1979, target date for
normalization if our concerns were met.
The Chinese began
their response in early December. In mi d-December, negotiations intensified with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping becoming
personally involved.
Finally, on December 14, we reached
agreement that met our funda mental concerns an d the announcement of our decision to establish diplomatic relations
was made on December 15.
We have been able to establish full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in a way that
protects the well-being of the people on Taiwan.
The
importance of this is fully reflected in the arrangements
that we have been and will be establishing.
First, the United Stat~s will not abrogate the Mutual
Defense Treaty.
Rather, we have given noti ce that we will
exercise our right to terminat e the Treaty with Taiwan in
accordance with its provisions, which permits t e rmination by
either party after one year's not ice.
All other treati es
and agree~ents will remain in e f fect.
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question of the peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.
It is clear from the actions and statements of
the PRC in the last month that normalization has, in fact,
enhanced the po s s i b i 1 it i e s that wh a t ever the u 1 t i mate
resolution of the issue may be, . it will be pursued by
peaceful means.
!·
Since the normalization of relations, the PRC has
adopted a markedly more moderate tone on the Taiwan issue:
On January 9 of this year, Vice Premier Deng
told Senators Nunn, Glenn, Hart and CoheP., that, "The social
system on Taiwan will be decided by the people of Taiwan.
Changes might take 100 years or 1, 000 years.
By which I
mean a long time.
We will not change
the society by
force."
On New Year's Day, after 25 years, the
PRC ceased firing propaganda artillery shells at the of£shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
Third and finally, after the
termination of the
Mutual Defense Treaty on December 31, 1979, we will continue our previous policy of selling carefully selected
defensive weapons to Taiwan.
While the PRC said they
disapproved of this, they nevertheless moved forward
with normalization with full knowledge of our intentions.
In constructing a new relationship with the people
on Taiwan, we are taking practical steps to ensure continuity of trade, cultural, and other unofficial relations.
The President has taken steps to assure the uninterrupted
continuation of such relations from January 1, 1979.
In the
future these relations will be conducted through a nonprofit non-governnental corporation called the American
Institute in Taiwan.
This corporation will facilitate
ongoing, and we are confident, expanding ties between the
American people and the people on Taiwan.
Taipei will
handle its unofficial relations with this country in similar
fashion.
Let me say a word or two about the American Institute in Taiwan, the legislation it requires, and its operations.
Congress wi 11 be asked to approve an omnibus bill
that will authorize the funding of the American Institute in
Taiwan and confirm its authority to act in a wide range of
areas.
I hope we will have your active support for expeditious passage of that bill.
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It will provide the
full range of commercial and other services that have been
previously provided through official channels to businessmen, both from the United States and from Taiwan.
In your
private business dealings on Taiwan, you may freely contact
the Institute's staff for advice or can deal directly with
local firms and the authorities ther¢.
In short, we see no
change necessary in the way private American business has
been conducted on Taiwan up to now.
EXIM loans, OPIC
guarantees and other important arrangements will continue.
With these new arrangements in place,
we expect
Taiwan to continue to prosper.
Taiwan's dynamic economic
growth is one of the most impressive stories of the last
decade~
it is now our eighth largest trading partner,
and per capita income is among the highest in Asia.
As anyone who has studied the issue can attest, normalization of relations with Pekinq was not an easy step to
take.
The d iff icul ties always argued for themselves, and
further delay was always an inviting option for any President.
But we all recognized that sooner or later we would
have to move.
As I have already said, failure to try to
move forward would have left us in danger of moving backwards -- at great cost to our global position.
By the time
we took the decisive step every other member of NATO, our
two treaty partners in ANZUS, and Japan had long since
recognized the PRC, as had most other nations of the world.
They were ready for our action -- and most of them, including all the members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, applauded it.
When we acted, we did so in a way that enhances
significantly the prospects for stability and peace in Asia
and the Pacific.
We acted in a way that will move us
towards our objective of a stable system of independent
nations in Asia, and that will also increase the chances of
maintaining a stable equilibrium among the United States,
Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.
The United States will continue to play an active
role in order to maintain that stable equilibrium.
For
reasons of geography, history a nd economics, we are as much
a Pacific nation as an Atlantic nation, with deep and
abiding national interests in the region.
We will maintain
balanced and flexible military forces in the region, as the
recent, successful conclusion of the base agreements with
the Philippines so c l early demonstrates.
And we will not
hesitate to act, as required, to ?rotec t our vital national
interests.
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The rapidly expanding relations between our
two
nations in science, trade and exchanges require the kind of
structure that diplomatic relations can provide.
It
will allow a much freer exchange between our cultures.
And with full relations, we are in ;a far better position to
encourage China's role as a constructive member of the world
community.
We will be discussing all of these matters with
Vice Premier Deng when he visits us in two weeks.
It is particularly usefu l on this occasion to note
some of the economic benefits we expect to flow from the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC.
These
include our participation as a regular supplier of agricultural commodities to China, the ability of u.s. exporters
to compete on an equal basis with other suppliers, and the
resumption of shipping, air, banking, and other normal
economic relations with China.
Let me emphasize that in normalizing relations we
acted in a way that does not threaten any other nation, but
can increase the sense of community of nations that we seek
to encourage.
We believe that China has an important role to play
in the search for global peace and stability.
The same is
true for the Soviet Union.
Our national interests are best
served when we seek to improve relations with both nations
while protecting our vi tal s tra teg ic interests.
This was
the case during the late winter and spring of 1972, a period
during which both the Shanghai Communique and SALT I were
achieved.
Equilibrium and stability, not isolation, are our
strategic objectives. For this reason, we also look forward
to the early conclusion of the SALT agreement with the
Soviet Union and to improvement of our trade relations with
the Soviets as well as the Chinese.
In conclusion, let JTle urge you to support the Pres ident' s decision and the legislation to continue relations
with the people on Taiwan.
We seek your support in explaining the strategic and historic necessity of this
action.
And we encourage you to develop greater trade and
contact with both the People's Republic of China and the
people on Taiwan.
It was just short of seven years from the Shanghai
Communique to normalization of relations.
Through a difficult period, two great nations began to restore contact and
shape a new relationship.
We a ::.. l recognize that a new era
is upon us.
Opportunities previously denied to us have
now begun to take shape.

. .
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The nations grouped in and around the world's largest ocean, the Pacific, contain close to half the world's
population. These nations must decide whether to choose the
path of greater cooperation and growth or to enter into a
period of unresolved struggles for influence.
For our part, the United Stat~s will enter the closing
decades of the 20th century ready to play a leading role in
the search for peace and economic well-being.
The lack
of diplomatic relations between the United States and
China was an obstacle to progress for many years. Having now
surmounted it, we face the tremendous challenge ahead with a
sense of excitement and hope.

